El papel de la información en mercados experimentales

  1. Enrique Fatas 1
  2. Antonio J. Morales 2
  1. 1 University of East Anglia
    info

    University of East Anglia

    Norwich, Reino Unido

    ROR https://ror.org/026k5mg93

  2. 2 Universidad de Málaga
    info

    Universidad de Málaga

    Málaga, España

    ROR https://ror.org/036b2ww28

Zeitschrift:
Economía industrial

ISSN: 0422-2784

Datum der Publikation: 2017

Titel der Ausgabe: Economía experimental

Nummer: 403

Seiten: 11-18

Art: Artikel

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Andere Publikationen in: Economía industrial

Zusammenfassung

Relative performance information may generate first order effects in the overall performance of financial and oligopolistic markets. In the laboratory, we may systematically manipulate the amount of information agents receive, and measure its effect. Recent experimental literature strongly suggests that this information may distort market performance and deepen financial crisis.

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