Public goods and decay in networks

  1. Enrique Fatas 1
  2. Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez 2
  3. Antonio J. Morales 2
  4. Hector Solaz 3
  1. 1 University of East Anglia
    info

    University of East Anglia

    Norwich, Reino Unido

    ROR https://ror.org/026k5mg93

  2. 2 Universidad de Málaga
    info

    Universidad de Málaga

    Málaga, España

    ROR https://ror.org/036b2ww28

  3. 3 University of Birmingham
    info

    University of Birmingham

    Birmingham, Reino Unido

    ROR https://ror.org/03angcq70

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Journal:
SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

ISSN: 1869-4195

Year of publication: 2015

Volume: 6

Issue: 1

Pages: 73-90

Type: Article

DOI: 10.1007/S13209-014-0114-X DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

Abstract

We propose a simple behavioral model to analyze situations where (1) a group of agents repeatedly plays a public goods game within a network structure and (2) each agent only observes the past behavior of her neighbors, but is affected by the decisions of the whole group. The model assumes that agents are imperfect conditional cooperators, that they infer unobserved contributions assuming imperfect conditional cooperation by others, and that they have some degree of bounded rationality. We show that our model approximates quite accurately regularities derived from public goods game experiments.

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