Public goods and decay in networks
- Enrique Fatas 1
- Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez 2
- Antonio J. Morales 2
- Hector Solaz 3
-
1
University of East Anglia
info
-
2
Universidad de Málaga
info
-
3
University of Birmingham
info
ISSN: 1869-4195
Année de publication: 2015
Volumen: 6
Número: 1
Pages: 73-90
Type: Article
D'autres publications dans: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association
Résumé
We propose a simple behavioral model to analyze situations where (1) a group of agents repeatedly plays a public goods game within a network structure and (2) each agent only observes the past behavior of her neighbors, but is affected by the decisions of the whole group. The model assumes that agents are imperfect conditional cooperators, that they infer unobserved contributions assuming imperfect conditional cooperation by others, and that they have some degree of bounded rationality. We show that our model approximates quite accurately regularities derived from public goods game experiments.